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Abstract 
This paper investigates the existence of ownership effects in the global oil and gas 
industry, i.e. whether there are systematic performance and efficiency differentials 
between National Oil Companies (NOCs) and privately-owned International Oil 
Companies (IOCs). The dataset, which is based on a survey published by Energy 
Intelligence and covers 1,001 firm observation years in the period 1987 to 2006, 
provides a unique corporate perspective on the industry’s development. After 
summarising the main trends emerging from the data and discussing some key issues 
of comparing ‘State Oil’ and ‘Private Oil’, I find that non-OPEC NOCs underperform 
their private sector counterparts in terms of labour and capital efficiency, revenue 
generation and profitability. I also find that much of these differences could be 
bridged through a change in ownership. OPEC producers show higher efficiency 
metrics than the private sector, which might be related to exogenous asset quality. All 
NOCs produce a significantly lower annual percentage of their upstream reserves, but 
this cannot serve as an indicator of efficiency. This paper complements the time-series 
analysis of oil privatisations in Wolf and Pollitt (2008) and suggests that a political 
preference for State Oil usually comes at an economic cost. 
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1 Introduction 
In July 1913, as Europe was already sliding towards war, the First Lord of the 
British Admiralty, a young Winston Churchill, set out the importance of oil to the 
nation: “If we cannot get oil, we cannot get corn, we cannot get cotton and we cannot 
get a thousand and one commodities necessary for the preservation of the economic 
energies of Great Britain”.1 Churchill considered security and diversity of oil supply 
to be of utmost importance – to achieve them the state could enter into long-term 
supply contracts as a temporary measure, but ultimately “the Admiralty should 
become the independent owner and producer of its own supplies of liquid fuel”.2 In 
1914, the British government therefore acquired a controlling stake in the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company, later renamed BP, setting a precedent for the many other state-
owned or ‘National Oil Companies’ (NOCs) to follow.3 For there were many 
governments around the world that deemed energy “too important to be left to the 
market” (Robinson 1993, p.57).4
The UK government of course famously changed its course in the late 1970s and 
initiated a worldwide move towards private ownership, but direct state involvement in 
oil and gas remains controversial. High energy prices, the resurgence of economic 
nationalism and recent asset nationalisations in Russia and Venezuela have re-ignited 
the debate, which for a long time had been muted when an automatism seemed to 
exist towards ever greater privatisation and liberalisation.5 To some, direct state 
control over resources is an indispensable feature of national sovereignty and political 
decision-making (Mommer 2002). To others, it remains an article of faith that public 
ownership results in lower economic efficiency, and that possible market failures 
should be addressed through regulation instead (Shleifer and Vishny 1998).  
In this paper I use a comprehensive dataset of oil and gas companies, covering the 
largest privately and publicly owned firms over the period 1987 to 2006, to 
investigate whether ownership matters in economic terms, i.e. whether over the past 
two decades ‘State Oil’ or ‘Private Oil’ have shown superior performance and 
                                                 
1 Statement to Parliament on 17 July 1913, as quoted in Yergin (1991, p.160). 
2 ibid. 
3 Critics might argue, though, that BP never was a ‘proper’ NOC, because the state never interfered in 
commercial operations, restricting its influence to the appointment of two directors to the board. 
4 I will use the terms ‘state’ and ‘government’ interchangeably in this paper. 
5 Klein (1999), at the time Chief Economist at Royal Dutch/Shell, predicted that all NOCs would be 
privatised by the year 2040. 
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efficiency. If there exists a trade-off between economic outcome and other, socio-
political considerations, the result can be used to quantify the economic cost of such 
trade-off. Direct comparisons of public and private companies can be affected by 
structural differences between firms, e.g. operational profile, non-commercial 
objectives, or the underlying geological asset quality, which need to be accounted for. 
In this paper, a number of observed variables are directly included within the 
multivariate regression specification. Furthermore, the panel structure of the dataset 
allows to control for all unobserved time-constant variables, and the comparison of 
different estimators provides insights as to the existence, importance and direction of 
such unobserved factors. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews 
previous studies on ownership effects; Section 3 sets out the different options 
available for state participation in the oil and gas sector; Section 4 introduces the data 
source for the empirical analysis and – using descriptive statistics of the data content – 
provides a corporate perspective onto the changing structure of the industry over the 
past two decades; Section 5 has the econometric analysis of ownership effects, 
including an important discussion on the comparability of results; Section 6 
concludes. There are also two Appendices: Appendix A summarises the historical role 
and key features of NOCs as the most prominent instruments of state control, 
Appendix B has the detailed descriptive statistical tables of the PIW dataset. 
Almost a century after Churchill made his case for a national interest in oil, we are 
again (still) debating the relative merit of State Oil versus Private Oil. This paper 
seeks to contribute to this important debate. 
 
2 Cross-sectional studies of ownership effects  
In the literature two basic study designs can be found to address the question of  
whether ownership matters: studies comparing samples of public firms with samples 
of (different) private firms; and studies looking at privatisation processes over time, 
whether in the form of a case study, a single-industry or single-country study, or a 
cross-industry cross-country study. For the purpose of simplicity, I will refer to the 
first group of studies, which aim to detect static ownership effects, as “cross-
sectional” (even though they might well make use of panel data), and to the second 
group of studies, which aim to trace dynamic privatisation effects, as “time-series” 
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analyses. Both approaches are closely connected: inherent static superiority of private 
ownership is a necessary condition for the success of privatisation, but not a sufficient 
one, since privatisation processes are dynamic and can include important changes 
other than ownership, such as political, regulatory and organisational changes 
(Villalonga 2000). The primary focus of this paper then is cross-sectional, aiming to 
identify and quantify differences in performance caused by differences in ownership. 
The rich panel dataset also permits an examination of the impact of ownership 
change, but has not been specifically collected for this purpose. A more detailed 
investigation of ownership change within the oil and gas industry is Wolf and Pollitt 
(2008), a time-series analysis of the performance and efficiency impact of all 
available privatisations since 1977.6  
Regarding the previous literature of cross-sectional analyses, Villalonga (2000) 
provides a concise summary of both original and review studies.7 Whilst a convincing 
majority of studies find evidence in favour of private ownership, she argues that many 
individual findings are not fully convincing as the comparisons are impaired by 
methodological difficulties. The choice of the appropriate measurement variable is 
one such issue, another is the fact that there are “interacting (non-separable) effects of 
ownership, competition and regulation” (Vickers and Yarrow 1988, p.39). 
Furthermore, it is often difficult to find appropriate groups of firms to compare – in 
many countries or sectors there exist only a small number of truly comparable 
companies, if any, under either form of ownership. Also, ownership itself might be 
endogenous i.e. subject to and the result of a system that includes both political and 
performance goals (Megginson and Netter 2001). In this sense there are often 
fundamental reasons why certain firms are government-owned, e.g. in the case of 
perceived market failure, public bail-out of a bankrupt private company or the 
provision of public goods. The judgement on the severity of these limitations is to 
                                                 
6 Using a dataset of 60 public share offerings by 28 NOCs, Wolf and Pollitt show that privatisation is 
associated with comprehensive and sustained improvements in performance and efficiency: over the 
seven-year period around the initial privatisation offering, return on sales increase by 3.6 percentage 
points, total output by 40%, capital expenditure by 47%, and employment intensity drops by 35%. 
Many improvements are realised in anticipation of the privatisation, accrue over time, and level off 
after the ownership change; they also seem to be largely achievable through partial privatisation alone. 
7 For a literature review of time-series studies of privatisation as well as the underlying theories please 
see Wolf and Pollitt (2008). 
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some extent in the eye of the beholder, which is why different reviewers of the 
literature have come to different conclusions as to general direction of findings.8  
Amongst the more influential individual studies, Boardman and Vining (1989) 
examine the economic performance and efficiency of the 500 largest non-U.S. 
industrial companies in 1983. They find that state-owned and mixed (partly state-
owned, partly privately-owned) companies are significantly less profitable and 
efficient than their private counterparts but that mixed enterprises do not outperform 
SOEs. In a different study of the same authors (Vining and Boardman 1992), using a 
sample of Canadian companies, the results of SOEs versus private enterprises are 
confirmed, but contrary to the first study Vining and Boardman find that mixed 
enterprises are more profitable than SOEs. Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), following 
the general approach of Boardman and Vining (1989), test the differences in 
profitability, labour intensity, and debt levels between private and public companies 
in the 500 largest international companies, as reported in Fortune for 1975, 1985, and 
1995. Controlling for firm size, location, industry, and business-cycle effects, they 
find convincing evidence that private companies are significantly more profitable, less 
labour-intensive and exhibit lower levels financial leverage. Contrary to these results, 
Caves and Christensen (1980) and Martin and Parker (1995) suggest that there is no 
inherent superiority of private firm performance. Instead, these studies argue that 
competition in the product market is the key determinant of firm efficiency and that 
subsequently public and private firms are equally efficient if operating under 
competitive conditions. 
 
Cross-sectional studies of the oil and gas industry 
The fate of the oil and gas sector was of obvious public and political interest in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, and a number of important contributions on oil resource 
ownership date from this period (e.g. Heller 1980; Jaidah 1980; Grayson 1981). 
Thereafter, however, the industry received limited attention as oil prices were low, 
supply seemed secure, and the fall of communism opened new opportunities for 
Western International Oil Companies (IOCs). This changed only with the dramatic 
increase in commodity prices since 2000, coupled with the entry of India and 
                                                 
8 To illustrate the degree of subjectivity involved in the interpretation, Villalonga (2000) cites one 
study (Hirsch 1965) that has been classified as favourable to state ownership, favourable to private 
ownership, and as neutral by at least one reputable reviewer each. 
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particularly China into the global oil market and the resurgence of OPEC importance. 
Valuable contributions on the subject matter have followed suit, e.g. Linde (2000), 
Stevens (2004), Marcel (2006), and Hartley and Medlock (2007)9. 
But comprehensive empirical analyses are still few in numbers, and this is largely 
due to a lack of data on NOCs, the operations of which are often characterised by a 
distinct lack of transparency.10 Al-Obaidan and Scully (1991) investigate the 
efficiency differences between 44 international private and state-owned petroleum 
companies (observed between 1976 and 1982), using Aigner-Chu frontier, stochastic 
frontier (SFA) and Gamma frontier analysis. Controlling for multinationality and 
operational integration they find that state-owned enterprises are only 61% to 65% as 
technically efficient as private firms. Two recent other cross-sectional studies make 
use of the same data source for industry data (the PIW ranking of the largest global oil 
and gas companies) as this paper. Eller et al. (2007) use nonparametric Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as well as parametric SFA on a sample of 80 firms for 
the period 2002-04, testing the theoretical predictions developed in Hartley and 
Medlock (2007).11 Taking revenues as output and number of employees, oil reserves 
and gas reserves as inputs, they calculate an average DEA technical efficiency score 
for NOCs of 0.27, compared to a sample average of 0.40 and an average score for the 
five biggest private companies of 0.73. The SFA results are not strictly comparable 
but yield a similar picture. The addition of structural firm variables to the model 
specification, e.g. the degree of government ownership and domestic fuel subsidies, 
moves all firms closer to the efficient frontier, but particularly NOCs. Such structural 
features therefore seem to explain large parts of the inefficiencies of NOCs. It should 
be noted, however, that part of the observed increase in efficiency is a mere technical 
consequence of including additional variables in the model. Based on approximately 
90 firms observed in the year 2004, Victor (2007) also analyses the relative efficiency 
of NOCs and private oil companies in converting reserves into production and 
revenues, but uses a univariate linear regression to do so. She finds that the biggest 
private oil companies are nearly one-third better than NOCs at converting reserves 
                                                 
9 The last paper is part of a research programme at Rice University with several interesting 
contributions on NOCs: http://www.rice.edu/energy/research/nationaloil/index.html. 
10 For an overview of possible data sources for NOCs see Rosser (2000) and Arnott (2004). 
11 Hartley and Medlock argue that NOCs are likely to favour excessive employment, to under-invest in 
reserves, and to (be forced to) sell oil products in the domestic market at subsidised prices. 
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into actual output, and tend to generate significantly more revenue per unit of output. 
Victor concludes that some of the NOCs reserves are effectively “dead oil”.  
This paper can be seen to build on the analyses of Eller et al. (2007) and Victor 
(2007), but it investigates a broader range of issues using a significantly more 
comprehensive dataset (covering the Top 50 oil and gas companies globally over a 
period of twenty years), which allows for cross-sectional as well as for panel analysis 
of the data – somewhat surprisingly it is the first multivariate regression analysis of 
the impact of ownership in the oil and gas industry. 
 
3 State Oil vs. Private Oil 
This paper takes as the unit of analysis corporate entities operating within the oil 
and gas industry and classifies them based on ownership structure, i.e. to what extent 
shareholders belong to the private or public sector.12 In this sense the distinction 
between State Oil and Private Oil is equivalent to the widely used dichotomy between 
National Oil Companies (NOCs) and International Oil Companies (IOCs), which is 
historically rooted in the 1970s.13 NOCs are owned and controlled by governments, 
with a minimum state interest of between 30% and 50%14, whereas IOCs are 
predominantly or exclusively privately-owned (Linde 2000; Stevens 2004). NOCs are 
certainly the most prominent feature of active state participation in the industry, and 
the power vested in these companies is a good indication for the degree of state 
interventionism. It should be pointed out, however, that state involvement can also 
take forms other than equity ownership of corporatised entities; indeed, there is a wide 
range of tools and policies available to nation states – a continuum of governance 
mechanisms (Laffont and Tirole 1993) – to determine the forms and degree of State 
Oil vs. Private Oil involvement. 
For the upstream, the most fundamental decision is between public or private 
ownership of the subsoil. As of today, the U.S. is the only country to have opted for 
private ownership – all others chose to retain at least a state veto (Mommer 2002).15 
                                                 
12 For a discussion on the meaning of “ownership” see Learmount and Roberts (2006) 
13 The term ‘IOC’ can be misleading since an increasing number of NOCs are also operating on an 
international basis. Also, there are some companies that are neither state-owned nor international. 
14 Both thresholds (30% or 50%) can be found in the literature, reflecting the broader discussion in 
accounting on effective ownership and consolidation of subsidiaries. 
15 Mommer quotes a speech given by Mirabeau in 1791 to the French National Assembly, outlining his 
reasons to reject private ownership of subsoil mineral resources. According to Mirabeau, subsoil 
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Where the subsoil is publicly owned, government has the choice to either grant a 
monopoly right to one particular party, or to put into place a licensing system for the 
participation of multiple parties. Allocation mechanism and fiscal terms are prominent 
features of a licensing regime as they will determine access and “government take” 
(i.e. total government share in economic profits).16 States can obviously use the 
licensing system as a tool to shape industry structure, e.g. by deciding on the 
frequency and magnitude of any licensing agreements (whether by auction or  
negotiated deal), by setting particular economic (dis-)incentives, or by imposing 
conditions such as mandatory involvement of the state. 
When the state wishes to participate in the oil sector itself, either as the monopolist 
or as a license taker, it can do so in the form of a corporate firm or of a public bureau 
(Horn 1995).17 State-owned enterprises are certainly more common in the oil sector – 
as for most products where consumption can be easily measured, marginal costs are 
non-negligible and price elasticity of demand is sufficiently high (Peltzman 1989) – 
which opens up the possibility of introducing private shareholders via (part-) 
privatisation. Even without formal privatisation, NOCs can bring in private sector 
partners either as service contractors or as joint-venture partners at the operating 
level.18 All of the above governance structures, with the exception of subsoil 
ownership, also apply to downstream markets. Because taxation of both upstream and 
downstream oil is generally very high and includes sector-specific taxes, it is an 
important tool of rent distribution and state participation under any system – even in 
the relations between governments and their NOCs, as taxation to a large extent 
determines the degree of independence of the NOCs.  
Just as State Oil and Private Oil need not be mutually exclusive options, there is 
no necessary conflict when the two meet. Oil and gas projects are highly capital 
                                                                                                                                            
minerals do not lend themselves to partition and often the capital and knowledge required for their 
exploitation is not in the hands of single surface owners. Subsoil resources should “belong to the 
nation, but only in the sense that they cannot be worked without her consent” (p.11). 
16 The three generic types of fiscal regimes are royalty/tax systems, production sharing contracts, and 
service agreements. Total government take around the world varies from around 40% (e.g. in U.S. 
Deepwater and the UK) to well over 90% (e.g. in Iran’s first buyback round and for some blocks in 
Libya’s 2005 auction) (Johnston 2007).    
17 Aharoni (1986) suggests three key characteristics of a state-owned enterprises (SOEs): they are 
owned (or majority controlled) by the government; they are engaged in the production of goods and 
services for sale; and their sales revenues should bear some relationship to costs. Public bureaus, on the 
other hand, are “nonprofit organizations which are financed, at least in part, by  periodic appropriation 
or grant” (Niskanen 1971, p.15). 
18 Where a significant part of the asset base of the NOC is privatised without an official recognition of 
such policy, this might be referred to as “back-door” privatisation (Al-Mazeedi 1998). 
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intensive19, have long lead times and are inherently risky (Stevens 2005). Particularly 
in the upstream, oil companies are usually partnering each other to diversify risk and 
financing requirements, and to complement each others skills set.20 Within a maturing 
industry, the incentives for risk-sharing might become even stronger. Although there 
is no danger of running out of hydrocarbons in the foreseeable future (Lynch 2004; 
Greene et al. 2006; Watkins 2006), the majority of the traditional onshore and 
shallow-water offshore fields is depleting and new developments, such as deep-water 
offshore or remote areas with challenging climate and no existing infrastructure links, 
will become more technically complex and increasingly costly. Relationships between 
NOCs and IOCs have often been rocky, and some of these issues can undoubtedly be 
traced back to the nationalisation disputes of the 1970s. In more recent years, even 
where OPEC NOCs offered to open up upstream projects to foreign participation (e.g. 
Saudi Gas Initiative), the IOCs have frequently declined on the basis of unsatisfactory 
returns.21 Given the challenges ahead, however, an increased degree of cooperation 
might not just be desirable, but plain necessary (Marcel 2006). 
 
4 The dataset – industry trends, 1987-2006 
As the data source for much of this cross-sectional analysis on ownership 
differentials I use an annual ranking of the world’s largest oil and gas companies, 
which is published annually as a supplement to the ‘Petroleum Intelligence Weekly’ 
(PIW). In this section I will briefly introduce this data source and discuss its key 
advantages vis-à-vis other available rankings. Thereafter, some descriptive statistics 
will be used for a first characterisation of the data content, yielding a fresh perspective 
onto the changing structure of the oil and gas industry over the past two decades. 
 
                                                 
19 A 2003 estimate of capital expenditure for the 50 largest global oil and gas upstream projects over 
the coming years was US$210 billion, i.e. in excess of US$4 billion per project (Goldman Sachs 2003), 
but given recent and very prominent cases of substantial cost overruns (e.g. Kashagan, Snoehvit, 
Sakhalin, Bonga, etc.) the ultimate costs of these projects are likely to be much higher.  
20 Technical expertise and project control are skills that are usually ascribed to IOCs, but NOCs can add 
value through local and regional market knowledge, political connections, help in accessing required 
infrastructure, as well as with making the projects more palatable to the domestic public. 
21 With no suitable reinvestment opportunities at hand, IOCs have increasingly returned excess cash to 
shareholders, a marked difference to the time before the mid-1980s, when IOCs first introduced 
shareholder value-based management (Cibin and Grant 1996; Stevens 2005). 
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4.1 The PIW ranking of oil and gas companies 
Each year PIW collects operational and financial data on over 130 oil and gas 
firms worldwide. The six operational data categories are oil reserves, gas reserves, oil 
production, gas production, refinery capacity, and oil product sales volumes. Where 
available there is also information on the firms’ revenues, net income, balance sheet 
assets, number of employees, and the level of state ownership. The final ranking then 
features the 50 companies that are top in the equal-weighted sum of the six 
operational rankings.22 It is usually published in December, based on the disclosed 
information of the previous calendar year. The first ranking dates from 1988 (based 
on 1987 data), so that the December 2007 issue represents the 20th edition. 
PIW collects its data primarily from company sources and annual reports, but in 
some cases secondary sources or estimates are used to fill disclosure gaps. In practice, 
data on the six operational criteria is provided consistently for all companies in the 
sample, whereas for the more secretive state-owned firms (such as Saudi Aramco or 
NIOC in Iran) the financial indicators are frequently lacking, owing to the lack of 
disclosure and the bigger uncertainties of estimation for these metrics. Data on 
reserves, output and refining capacity are adjusted to exclude equity shares owned by 
other companies, and revenues, net income, and total balance sheet assets are 
converted to U.S. Dollars at the average exchange rates of each year. 
The key advantage of the PIW dataset over other, more financially oriented 
rankings is the inclusion of – and focus on – operational data. First, operational data is 
largely independent of the unavoidable accounting differences between countries.23 
Second, financial results are often impacted by local price premia/discounts (based on 
transport differentials, different physical qualities of the hydrocarbons, etc.), subsidies 
and other price distortions, all of which are very difficult to control for. And thirdly, 
the focus on operational data allows it to include in the sample some of the most 
important NOCs globally, for which only such data (or estimates) are available. In 
short, the combination of operational and financial data allows a more comprehensive 
and meaningful analysis of the global oil and gas sector than would be possible based 
on financial metrics alone.  
                                                 
22 The ranking in PIW comprises the Top 50 companies. PIW’s publisher, Energy Intelligence Group, 
also issue a separate publication with an annual ranking of the Top 100 companies in the industry, but 
this is not available for the full twenty years.  
23 This is certainly true for financial accounting. We will see that there can be serious issues associated 
with the oil and gas reserves accounting, too. 
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Whereas most other publications (such as the BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy) are usually compiled on a country-by country basis, the PIW data provides a 
corporate perspective on the industry’s development over the past two decades. 
Whilst in a few instances – namely NOCs with monopoly position in the domestic 
market and no international asset exposure – the two perspectives are identical, more 
often than not there are differences: the more subtle ones come in the form of NOCs 
increasingly acquiring international assets, or through the gradual opening of formerly 
protected markets to outside participation; the more substantial differences are due to 
the global operating presence of the IOCs, with a majority of assets usually based 
outside their respective home countries. Any differences between country and 
company perspective can be very relevant from a policy perspective. 
 The original PIW data as described above has been checked for internal 
consistency across different years and, where necessary, adjusted using primary data 
sources.24 It has also been supplemented by a number of items. In order to take full 
advantage of the available information, all companies and their home countries are 
given unique identifiers over time.25 The exact percentage of state (voting) ownership 
has been added where this was not already part of the original dataset, and all entries 
have been grouped according to four distinct ownership types: 
 ‘Own-1’: fully state-owned NOCs, i.e. public ownership of no less than 100%; 
 ‘Own-2’: majority state-owned companies, i.e. public voting ownership in 
excess of 50%26; 
 ‘Own-3’: minority state-owned companies, i.e. state ownership greater than zero 
but below the 50% mark; and  
 ‘Own-4’: fully private companies with no state ownership whatsoever. 
 
Further additional variables are the IMF’s annual Consumer Price Indices; 
deflated (real-terms) financial indicators, calculated from the nominal PIW values and 
                                                 
24 Where data was found to be inconsistent but no alternative data source was available, the entries 
were usually deleted. For employment, data extrapolations for single years were made when data for 
the periods immediately before and after was available. For Russian companies other than Gazprom, 
changes were made to early estimates of gas reserves in order to align them with reported data from 
later years. A full list of changes is available upon request. 
25 In the case of acquisitions (or mergers) only the identifier of the surviving company (or of the higher-
ranked company in the year prior to the merger) is carried forward for the combined entity.   
26 Brazil, for example, has reduced its economic ownership in to below 50% in 2000, but retains a 
voting majority stake. Also, due to the peculiar voting and share transfer stipulations put in place at the 
privatisation, Gazprom of Russia is considered to have always been under majority state control post 
1993, even though the government’s share for a number of years had officially dropped to just 38%. 
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the appropriate CPI deflators; the annual average real-terms crude oil price and global 
refining margin (average of US Gulf Coast, North-West Europe and Singapore), 
sourced from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy; a dummy variable for 
countries with OPEC membership; and finally, annual data on domestic fuel prices 
(blended value of diesel and super gasoline, in US$ per litre), sourced from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators database.27 The price of transport fuels for the 
final customer is treated as an inverse proxy for the extent of fuel subsidies (Eller et 
al. 2007), although this admittedly does not take into account any differences in 
taxation, which might be just as substantial. 
 
4.2 A corporate view on the industry 
Comparing the aggregate operating output of the 50 oil and gas companies 
featured in the annual PIW ranking with the total global output as estimated by the BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy (BP 2007), the coverage of the PIW dataset 
becomes more comprehensive over time, indicating an ongoing consolidation trend in 
the industry. Coverage of global oil production increases from 59% in 1987 to 80% in 
2006 (73% on average), coverage of global gas production increases from 36% to 
69% (58% average), and coverage of global refining capacity increases from 53% to 
60% (57% average).  
The dataset has a total of 1,001 observations (20 years of 50 observations each, 
plus in 2003 two firms were tied for the 50th place in the ranking). Of these, 406 
observations are of fully state-owned companies, 127 of majority state-owned 
companies, 67 of minority state-owned companies, and 401 observations are of fully 
private firms. There is a remarkably stable group of companies that make it into – and 
frequently to the top of – the rankings year after year. In fact, 27 companies have 
featured in the Top 50 ranking in every single year over the past two decades.28 
Overall, there are 87 different companies in the dataset, and for 52 of these there are 
at least 10 years of data, though not necessarily in consecutive years. Comparing the 
years 1987 and 2006, the number of fully private companies in the Top 50 has 
remained virtually constant (20 vs. 21), whereas the number of fully state-owned 
                                                 
27 The earliest observations listed in the WDI database are for the year 1991, the last observations date 
from 2004 (the series were discontinued thereafter). The data is usually reported every two years only, 
in intermitting years they were assumed to be constant compared to the prior year’s observation.  
28 Amongst those 27, there are 15 fully state-owned firms and 8 fully private firms. 
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companies has dropped from 26 to 18, and the number of ‘hybrids’ or ‘mixed-
ownership’ companies has increased from 4 to 11.  
 
F-1: Frequency distribution of panel dataset F-2: Number of companies by ownership type 
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T-1: Operating statistics of ‘typical’ companies by ownership type 
% %
1987 2006 change 1987 2006 change 1987 2006 change
Own-1:
 - Mean 36,944 76,137 +106% 997 2,602 +161% 489 1,017 +108%
 - Median 6,497 36,396 +460% 704 1,827 +160% 456 570 +25%
Own-2:
 - Mean 2,985 24,059 +706% 543 2,519 +364% 648 986 +52%
 - Median 3,170 6,819 +115% 589 1,114 +89% 515 325 -37%
Own-3:
 - Mean 1,682 2,794 +66% 404 758 +88% 976 310 -68%
 - Median 1,682 1,809 +8% 404 489 +21% 976 265 -73%
Own-4:
 - Mean 3,407 7,187 +111% 910 1,432 +57% 1,172 1,238 +6%
 - Median 1,799 4,221 +135% 475 730 +54% 580 347 -40%
O&G reserves O&G production Refining capacity %
 
Notes:  
- Oil and gas reserves are expressed in millions of barrels of oil equivalent, production and refining capacity in 
thousands of barrels of oil equivalent per day.  
- In 1987 there was only one company within the ‘Own-3’ category. 
 
Of the 87 companies featured in the dataset, 23 have always been under full and 
exclusive state-control, whereas 35 firms have always belonged to the private 
sector.29 28 firms have seen changes in their ownership structure, i.e. they have been 
partially or fully privatised.30 It is also worth pointing out that the large oil and gas 
companies from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and China only enter the rankings 
after they had been properly corporatised. Lukoil is included in the rankings since 
                                                 
29 Our time horizon for this statement only starts after the wave of asset and corporate nationalisations 
seen in the 1970s. Clearly some, or even most, of the assets that make up today’s largest NOCs once 
“belonged” to the private, Western oil companies.  
30 Of those 28 privatised companies, 10 are based in the Former Soviet Union, and 3 are based in the 
P.R. of China. One company in the sample, PDO of Oman, has since its inception been under part-
state, part-private ownership, without any substantive changes in recent years. 
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1992, Gazprom and CNPC (the unlisted parent company of PetroChina) since 1993, 
most other Russian companies since 1994, and Sinopec (again the unlisted parent 
company) since 1998. 
Figures 3 to 5 show the relative contribution of the companies to total oil 
production, gas production and refining capacity, when grouped according to their 
ownership status as defined earlier. On the oil side of the industry, the majority of the 
upstream production remains in fully state-owned hands, whereas refining 
traditionally has been dominated by the private sector – but this primacy is gradually 
fading due to asset restructurings by the IOCs and continued efforts to improve 
downstream integration by some large NOCs. The relative weights in gas production 
shifted dramatically in 1993 with the inclusion of part-privatised Gazprom in the 
rankings. All three charts bear witness to the increasing importance of mixed-
ownership companies within the industry, even when disregarding Gazprom. 
Figure 6 and 7 plot the evolution of state ownership in the upstream and 
downstream segments, respectively. For each company the exact percentage of state 
ownership is weighted by that company’s relative contribution to the total output in 
each year, so that an industry-wide indicator of state ownership can be calculated. In 
2006, the overall state ownership of oil reserves was 89%, for gas reserves it was 
82%, for oil production 64%, for gas production 48%, for refining capacity 43%, and 
for oil product marketing 36%. A closer inspection of the development over time 
provides empirical support to some widely held perceptions of the industry’s 
development: since the early 1990s, after the fall of the communism, state ownership 
in both oil reserves and production was steadily reduced. But these trends have been 
reversed since 2002, when rising commodity prices, the resurgence of economic 
nationalism and increased OPEC production all contributed – once again – to a 
stronger role of the state in the oil markets. 
For gas the picture is slightly different: since the mid-1990s (after the part-
privatisation of Gazprom) the NOCs’ share in gas reserves has risen gradually as 
these companies now make an increased effort to find and to possibly exploit an 
increasingly valuable resource. The state ownership of the growing overall gas 
production has remained quite constant over the same period of time. In line with 
these observations, for the fully state-owned companies (ownership category 1) the 
share of oil within their total hydrocarbon reserves and production has been declining, 
as can be seen in Figure 8. 
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F-3: Oil production by ownership type F-4: Gas production by ownership type 
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Figure 9 shows the reserves-to-production (‘R/P’) ratio for each ownership type, 
indicating the number of years that a company could continue to produce at current 
pace, even without finding any additional reserves (an alternative interpretation of the 
R/P ratio is to see it as an indicator of how successful a company is converting its 
reserve base into commercial production). For most years the ratio for fully state-
owned companies is the largest by far, followed by the majority state-owned firms, 
the minority state-owned firms, and finally the fully private firms exhibiting the 
lowest R/P ratio for the majority of years.31 Another interesting result concerns the 
change of R/P ratios over time. Whilst the trend of declining ratios probably has 
several causes, for all but the fully state-owned firms this downward trend seems to 
begin with – or at least be reinforced by – the oil price crash in 1998. In its wake most 
private companies cut down their capex budgets and introduced severe economic 
hurdle rates for the development of new reserves, contributing to the shortfall in new 
supply coming to the market in recent years. The data confirms this to be true for the 
fully privately-owned firms, but also highlights that all companies listed on public 
stock markets (whether fully private, minority or majority state-controlled) seem to 
have been affected in a similar way. 
Looking at the operational integration of the business (Figure 10), the upstream 
integration ratio (oil production to oil refining) of the fully state-owned firms peaks in 
the year 1994 and declines thereafter. In 2006 these companies nevertheless produced 
more than double the amount of crude oil that they were able to refine. For fully 
private firms, the upstream integration ratio has been steadily climbing (from 53% to 
74%) due to an increased focus on E&P as well as refinery consolidation, in order to 
reduce overcapacities in the market. The downstream integration ratio (refining 
capacity to oil product sales) for the fully state-owned firms currently is very balanced 
at 101%, although they were slightly long in refining in the first years of the sample. 
For the fully private companies the ratio stands at approximately 70%, meaning that 
their wholesale and retail networks sell not only their own refined products, but 
purchase additional volumes from third party refiners.  
 
                                                 
31 The small number of observations in ownership categories 2 and 3 make these results more 
susceptible to individual outliers. For Own-2, e.g., the enormous gas reserve base of Gazprom is the 
most important single factor in determining their high R/P ratio. 
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T-2: Distribution of global output, based on home country of the producing firm 
1987 2006 1987 2006 1987 2006
 - USA and Canada 25% 13% 42% 17% 43% 24%
 - Mexico 7% 6% 1% 2% 4% 3%
 - Venezuela 5% 4% 3% 1% 3% 6%
 - Brazil 2% 3% 1% 1% 4% 4%
 - Saudi Arabia 12% 16% 4% 4% 3% 5%
 - Iran 7% 7% 2% 5% 2% 3%
 - Iraq 6% 3% 1% 0% 2% 1%
 - Kuwait 3% 4% 1% 1% 2% 2%
 - UAE and Qatar 3% 4% 2% 3% 1% 1%
 - Algeria 3% 3% 7% 4% 1% 1%
 - UK and NL 9% 7% 12% 10% 17% 13%
 - Norway 0% 2% 0% 2% 0% 1%
 - Other Europe 3% 5% 7% 7% 9% 10%
 - Russia - 10% - 32% - 7%
 - China - 5% - 3% - 11%
 - Others 15% 10% 17% 9% 10% 8%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Oil production Gas production Refining
 
 
As was stated earlier, there can exist significant differences between a country 
perspective and a company perspective on the global oil and gas sector, largely 
because of the global operations of the IOCs. Whilst the ultimate control over the 
subsoil will always rest with the host governments, it is unquestionable that the 
identity (in terms of cultural, political and other roots) and possibly even the home 
governments of multinational corporations can influence decision-making in the 
industry. Table 2 contrasts the geographic distribution of production and refining 
output for the years 1987 and 2006, whereas the distribution is based on the home 
countries of the oil and gas firms involved (not on the countries in which the assets 
are physically located). 
The most fundamental change – and the one that makes all other comparisons less 
straight forward – is the emergence of Russia and China as home countries to large, 
corporatised firms. It is obviously debatable whether it makes any practical difference 
whether a portfolio of assets is administered by a ministry (as was the case for both 
countries in 1987) or state-controlled corporate headquarters, other than adding 
another layer of decision-making. But one might argue that in both countries 
corporatisation has in fact strengthened management’s confidence, and limited its 
inhibitions, to openly and aggressively pursue a domestic agenda in its commercial 
dealings.  
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The decline in the relative importance of the U.S. is very marked.32 Also declined 
over time has the prominence of the two ‘traditional’ European oil and gas nations, 
the UK and NL, whereas Norway and the other European states have been 
strengthened – privatised NOCs such as Eni, Total, Repsol, which today rank as some 
of the industry’s key players, have been instrumental in this. Another key observation 
is that the Middle Eastern exporters – with the exception of Iraq – have not only 
defended their positions despite the new entrants, but have even managed to increase 
their global weighting in absolute and relative terms. Within this group, Saudi Arabia 
has clearly been focused on oil, whereas Iran has gained a lot of market share in the 
global gas markets. 
 
5 Performance and efficiency effects of ownership 
The literature review showed that the balance of empirical evidence points to 
better performance and greater efficiency in the private sector, although a number of 
caveats apply. Our 20-year dataset on the oil industry allows the investigation of 
several key aspects of performance: upstream production, reserve management, 
capital and labour efficiency, revenue generation, and profitability. The hypothesis is 
that “ownership matters” in favour of Private Oil, i.e. higher efficiency, revenue 
generation and profitability. I will argue, however, that differences in reserve 
management are not necessarily a good indicator of relative efficiency, as is implied 
by Eller et al. (2007) and Victor (2007).  
I will first discuss the issue of comparability between different oil companies, 
specifically between state-owned and privately-owned firms. This will be followed by 
a simple ratio analysis by ownership type, and finally by a multivariate regression 
analysis, which allows to control for some of the important structural differences 
between firms.    
 
                                                 
32 Canada’s contribution to the North American aggregate is very small. 
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5.1 Apples and apples: addressing issues of comparability 
When benchmarking performance and efficiency of firms, one needs to ensure that 
the objects of comparison are indeed comparable. Whilst this problem applies to any 
industry and also to private-vs-private benchmarking, the lack of disclosure at many 
NOCs makes it particularly difficult to control for relevant exogenous factors in a 
state-vs-private setting. Some of the key issues on which firms might fundamentally 
differ are: 
Non-commercial objectives. Critics argue that the use of standard performance 
measures, and profitability in particular, yields distorted results, because most SOEs 
pursue objectives other than profit maximisation (Bozec et al. 2006). For companies 
operating in competitive markets, however, Boardman and Vining (1989) maintain 
that if such posited social benefits are internal to the firm (e.g. in the form of excess 
employment), they can only be achieved at a deadweight loss of social welfare; and if 
the benefits are external to the firm (e.g. provision of social infrastructure), then 
profitability comparisons can at least reveal the shadow prices of these commitments. 
Because the oil and gas industry is not a natural monopoly and can very easily be run 
under competitive conditions, the author sides with the latter view. Nevertheless, a 
number of countries grant monopoly status to their NOCs (often seen as a 
compensation for non-commercial obligations), which can have material 
consequences in the form of market power and excess monopoly profits. 
Underlying asset quality.  Resource endowments are a powerful determinant of 
performance of any natural resources industry. Availability of hydrocarbons, ease of 
access, availability of supply/evacuation infrastructure, flow rates and production 
costs vary greatly between and within individual countries.33 Many of the most 
important NOCs are monopoly players blessed with a favourable resource 
endowment. But even where NOCs and private firms today compete within a country, 
the state firms have often (historically or by law) preferential access to the most 
attractive assets, whether upstream fields, refinery plant locations, or retail networks. 
But not all aspects of asset quality are exogenously prescribed by geology or 
geography – the impact of investment, technology and management is not to be 
                                                 
33 CSFB (2002) reports that there are about 500,000 producing wells in the U.S. with an average 
production of 14 barrels per day, whereas in the Middle East the average production per well is almost 
4,000 barrels per day. 
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underestimated. Distinguishing one from the other is critical in reaching a final 
judgement on managerial performance.  
Oil and gas reserves data. A number of important issues arise in the interpretation 
of oil and gas reserve estimates.34 First, there might be differences in the legal 
framework of reserve entitlement. Private oil companies usually bid for individual 
licences, covering areas which they intend to explore and develop in the near future. 
Only reserves associated with these licences can be “booked” as equity oil reserves. 
NOCs with monopoly powers, on the other hand, sometimes enjoy full entitlement to 
all reserves within a given country or region. Second, there is no uniform global 
approach to the estimation and certification of oil and gas reserves. Whilst there are 
established guidelines available35, these usually differ in important aspects.36 Many 
NOCs do not follow any of these recognised standards (or do not disclose which one 
they use), and even some of the large private IOCs follow the guidelines but fail to 
employ outside reserve auditors to verify their internal assessment.37 Third, due to the 
lack of a universally enforced standard, reserves data might be manipulated on 
political or other grounds. As an example, Kuwait experienced a gradual decline in its 
reserve base from 1980-84, but in 1985 the country reported a 50 percent increase in 
reserves with no corresponding discovery, which was apparently linked to OPEC’s 
decision to base its production quota system on country reserves (Campbell 1997).38 
Fourth, even where reserves are properly reported, different policies on reserve 
management can make comparisons difficult. The development of resources into 
reserves usually requires upfront investment, which a private sector company might 
not be willing to incur several years before the actual production phase.39 Given the 
                                                 
34 By industry convention, reserves are quantities which are anticipated to be commercially recoverable 
from known accumulations, whereas resources are quantities estimated to be potentially recoverable 
but which are either undiscovered or not currently considered to be commercially recoverable.   
35 Most widely used are the SPE (Society of Petroleum Engineers) and the U.S. SEC classifications, but 
others include e.g. the ‘ABC’ reserve system of the Former Soviet Union or Canada’s NI 51-101. 
36 SPE and SEC are broadly similar, but SEC requires existing prices to determine the commercial 
viability of reserves (SPE allows an averaging period), does not allow proved reserves below the 
‘lowest known hydrocarbons’ point, etc. Both SPE and SEC differ markedly from the Russian 
classification, which is only interested in the physical presence of reserves. Furthermore, there are 
different reserve categories under each system (e.g. proven, probable and possible reserves).  
37 Two examples should emphasise the magnitude of these issues: Mexican NOC Pemex reduced its 
proven reserve estimate from 60 billion barrels in 1997 to 22 billion in 2002 (-64%), mainly as a result 
of independent reserve audits according to SEC definition. Royal Dutch/Shell in January 2004 had to 
reduce its estimate for proven reserves by 20% following an external audit.  
38 For similar reasons, Campbell argues, did significant reserve increases take place in Abu Dubai, 
Dubai, Iran and Iraq in 1988, and Saudi Arabia in 1990. 
39 A quote from Sibneft (2004, p.6), at the time one of the few private oil companies to have access to a 
more than sufficient resource base: “Sibneft does not have a policy of maintaining an unnecessarily 
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pressures from equity analysts and investors, however, private companies often have a 
strong incentive to show a small but steady reserve growth. For a nation state, on the 
other hand, maximising the domestic reserve base as a signalling tool or even as a 
policy instrument might well be an appropriate choice, as would indeed be the option 
to deliberately delay the development of the resource base as a hedge against 
inflation, a bet for higher commodity prices, or an insurance policy for future 
generations. 
Operational profile. The various sub-segments of the oil and gas industry 
(upstream production of oil and gas, refining of oil, wholesale and retail of oil 
products, petrochemicals production, natural gas sales) have very different 
characteristics in terms of capital and personnel requirements, price volatility, 
competitive pressures, and ultimately profitability. Between 1996 and 2002, the return 
on capital employed in the upstream was on average 17.0%, whereas the comparable 
return for refining and marketing was 10.2% (UBS 2004). 
Taxation. It was shown earlier that the total government take from upstream 
taxation varies between 40% and 90% across the world (Johnston 2007), leading to 
great differences in the companies’ tax exposure. Furthermore, whilst some countries 
tax their NOCs consistently in line with other industry participants, others apply 
different and often intransparent sets of rules, and it largely depends on the individual 
country – and the power balance between government and NOC – whether such 
‘special’ NOC taxation is particularly lenient or particularly harsh.40 The picture 
might be further complicated by monetary transfers between NOC and the 
government to account for social provision, fuel subsidies, etc. 
Non-commercial objectives, the underlying asset quality, quality of reserves data, 
operational profile and taxation are thus important firm-specific features to consider 
in a direct comparison of oil companies. Unfortunately, reliable and comprehensive 
data is largely unavailable, except for the vertical integration ratios described earlier 
to measure the business mix. Three different approaches are taken in this paper to 
account for these important variables. First, some of the observed variables included 
in the regression specification can also be interpreted as proxy variables for other, 
                                                                                                                                            
long reserve life. We plan to maintain the current level of reserves, but to decrease reserve life to 15 – 
20 years by increasing crude oil production.”  
40 As an example, over the period 1997-2001, the tax on Mexican NOC Pemex was an astonishing 49% 
of total revenues (Moody's 2003). Since Pemex is a state monopoly there is no corresponding figure for 
the private sector in Mexico, but in the international context this is very “taxing” indeed. 
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unobserved factors: OPEC membership can be seen to indicate the political nature of 
state involvement, the quality of underlying upstream assets, and possibly the 
credibility of reserve estimates; retail fuel prices are an indication of fuel subsidies 
and thus of non-commercial obligations, which can also be suggested by high labour 
intensity ratios. Second, and more importantly, all of the five factors set out above are 
firm-specific but rarely change over time. Using a within (fixed-effects) panel 
estimator allows to control for all such unobserved but time-invariant variables (see 
Section 5.3), which is a very substantial advantage of this dataset over “simple” cross-
sectional analyses. Third, the quantitative regression results from the observed 
variables can also be used to infer the boundary conditions of the unobserved 
variables, i.e. to identify the conditions under which the reported results hold true.41
 
5.2 Ratio analysis 
Shown below are the long-term average performance and efficiency ratios for 
capital and labour efficiency, profitability, and revenue and income generation by 
ownership type of the firm. Upstream production and reserves management 
(measured by the ratio of production over reserves, i.e. the inverse of the R/P ratio) 
have been reported earlier in this paper. 
Based on the unadjusted ratios fully state-owned NOCs (Group 1) generate more 
physical output per employee and per US$ of invested capital than private IOCs 
(Group 4). It is plausible to assume, though, that the operational profile – with an 
average upstream integration ratio of 217% for NOCs vs. 60% for IOCs – has some 
leverage on this result. The business mix might also impacts on the ratio of 
employment to real assets, a measure of labour intensity, and the profitability metrics. 
As to the latter, the averages mask a remarkable change over time – up to the year 
1997, the NOCs outperform the other three groups on both profitability measures, but 
in the period since the oil price crash 1998 they have actually been the least 
profitable. Possible explanations include the value-based restructuring at IOCs after 
the 1998 oil price crash, which included a focus on profitability and the rejection or 
                                                 
41 For example, how much do taxes need to differ for the different groups of companies to be equally 
profitable? If there is more than one unobserved variable, these results are unlikely to be exact and 
unbiased, but provide an instructive approximation of the magnitude of the differences. 
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closure of low-threshold projects42, the efforts of IOCs to strengthen their upstream 
portfolio relative to refining and petrochemicals (which is reflected in the business 
integration ratios over time), and the much improved returns on refining and 
marketing since 2001.  
 
T-3: Long-term averages (1988-2006) of selected performance ratios 
Output / 
employee
Output /
real assets
Employees /
real assets
Return on 
sales
Return on 
assets
(kboe) (kboe/US$m) (US$m) (%) (%)
Own-1 42.0 84.6 1.95 11.2% 7.3%
Own-2 25.5 61.5 2.47 8.6% 7.3%
Own-3 27.8 58.4 2.04 7.4% 6.2%
Own-4 37.9 58.5 1.29 7.8% 6.3%
5 NOCs 68.8 90.8 1.33 8.8% 6.7%
5 IOCs 51.5 64.5 1.35 5.2% 4.1%
Real revenue /
employee
Real income /
employee
Real revenue /
reserves
Real income /
reserves
Real revenue /
output
Real income /
output
(US$m) (US$ '000s) (US$/boe) (US$/boe) (US$/boe) (US$/boe)
Own-1 0.44 45.7 1.3 0.10 12.2 1.30
Own-2 0.37 27.0 4.5 0.28 15.9 1.45
Own-3 0.50 40.5 5.9 0.34 19.6 1.41
Own-4 0.80 64.4 7.3 0.30 23.2 1.65
5 NOCs 0.77 67.9 0.3 0.03 10.4 1.03
5 IOCs 1.36 80.3 7.5 0.44 23.9 1.41
Capital and labour efficiency Profitability
Revenue and income generation
 
Notes: 
- Output is defined as the sum of oil and gas production, refining capacity and oil product sales.  
- Ratios for Own-2 and Own-3 are based on a small number of observations (6.4 and 3.4 on average) and are thus 
vulnerable to individual outliers. 
- Group of “5 NOCs” includes Saudi Aramco, NIOC, KPC, Sonatrach and PdVSA. Group of “5 IOCs” includes 
ExxonMobil, BP, RD/Shell, Chevron and ConocoPhillips. Only years with data for 3+ companies of either group 
are included in calculation 
 
Revenue generation per employee, per unit of output, and per unit of hydrocarbon 
reserves43 is significantly larger for the private sector, but this is unsurprising given 
its relative focus on higher-value downstream products. Moving from revenue 
generation to profit generation, the lower long-term average profitability of the private 
sector leads to a narrowing of the gap between NOCs and IOCs. 
Table 3 also shows the values for two company sub-samples: five of the largest 
fully state-owned NOCs (Saudi Aramco, NIOC, KPC, Sonatrach and PdVSA), and 
five of the largest private players (ExxonMobil, BP, RD/Shell, Chevron and 
                                                 
42 IOCs aggressively stress-tested project profitability, i.e. investments had to be NPV-positive at very 
low oil prices. Projects that survived this degree of scrutiny delivered spectacular returns in the high oil 
price environment post 2000.  
43 The table includes the ratio of revenues to reserves (as analysed in Eller et al. 2007), but for the 
detailed econometric analysis to follow this relationship will be de-composed into its two constituent 
parts of reserve management (production/reserves) and revenue generation (revenues/production). 
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ConocoPhillips). Unfortunately the largest NOCs tend to be amongst the most 
secretive, and to avoid the risk of unduly influential outliers only years are included in 
the calculation, for which at least 3 observations from either group are available. For 
some metrics, this reduces the sub-samples to 3 observation years over two decades, 
but even this limited data shows that bigger size is not necessarily correlated with 
higher profitability, or higher revenues or profits per unit of output.  
The univariate analysis thus illustrates the differences between ownership 
categories, but also the differences within ownership categories. Just as the output per 
employee ratio of the ‘top’ IOCs is not representative of the overall private sector, so 
do important differences exist between NOCs. The gulf between OPEC and non-
OPEC firms is particularly striking: across the 20-year sample non-OPEC firms on 
average have a 2.3 times higher labour intensity ratio (employees/assets) than OPEC 
firms and their output per employee is only at 36% of the OPEC benchmark. 
 
5.3 Regression analysis 
Multivariate regression analysis is able to identify the determinants of selected 
measures of corporate performance and efficiency, and to quantify the impact of 
ownership whilst controlling for other key variables. Because the dataset has a panel 
structure, a number of different estimators can be used: the total estimator, the 
between estimator, the within estimator, and the random-effects estimator. Following 
Petersen (2004), these different models can be interpreted as “different ways of 
describing the data, each yielding relevant insight in its own right” (p.334). The 
following analysis will focus on the total and within estimators. The between 
estimator makes comparisons between individuals in their average outcomes, but in 
the PIW dataset the time-distribution and frequency of observations varies between 
firms, which in a volatile pricing environment can lead to estimation bias. Random-
effects models are superior to within estimator in that they can measure both time-
variant and time-constant variables44, and are more efficient in using the available 
information, but make the strong assumption that the unmeasured time-constant 
variables are independent of the measured variables (Wooldridge 2002). Hausman 
tests have been conducted on all of the models described in the following, indicating a 
violation of this assumption and warranting the fixed-effects specification instead. 
                                                 
44 Fixed-effects models cannot interpret time-invariant (or very slowly moving) variables. 
 25
 ititit xy εβα +′+=    (1) 
 
The specification in (1) is the total estimator (or pooled or ordinary least squares 
estimator), where xit is a K-dimensional vector of explanatory variables and α is a 
non-unit-specific intercept. It ignores the grouped nature of the data and therefore 
roughly corresponds to the estimator obtained in standard cross-sectional analysis, 
except that individual firms may contribute with more than one observation (Petersen 
2004). In the context of this paper the total estimator yields the performance 
differential between companies of different ownership structure, controlling for a 
given set of other independent variables. There is no inherent bias in the results 
relative to this question posed, but the estimated effect of ownership might still in part 
reflect other, unobserved variables. 
 
 ititiiit xDy εβδα +′++=    (2) 
 
The within estimator (or fixed effects or least squares dummy variable (LSDV) 
estimator) as set out in (2) recognises the group structure of the data and includes a 
firm-specific dummy variable Di, which changes the intercept for each company to 
capture all (observed and unobserved) time-invariant variables. It therefore controls 
for a broader range of variables. Importantly, it estimates the within-individual 
changes over time, i.e. the effect of a change in ownership on performance and 
efficiency, rather than the total difference between two types of ownership status. In 
fact, the within estimator needs changes in ownership to estimate this variable 
because ownership otherwise would be an additional time-invariant factor included in 
the unit-specific intercept. One might therefore consider a trade-off between the total 
estimator, which uses all cross-sectional information on ownership but cannot account 
for unobserved variables, and the within estimator, which controls for all time-
invariant variables but cannot use observations with no within-individual variation 
over time, and therefore uses the data much less efficiently (Beck 2001; Wilson and 
Butler 2007). Each different estimators conveys useful information on its own, but 
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any arising differences between them can often also be rationalised and thus 
contribute to a fuller understanding of the subject matter.45  
Except for upstream production, the performance and efficiency metrics tested in 
the following are ratios. To estimate the impact of state ownership on these 
performance ratios, there are two alternative model specifications. First, the ratio itself 
can be used as the dependent variable, regressed upon a variable for state ownership 
and a set of control variables – the “direct ratio model”. Alternatively, the output 
variable (the numerator of the ratio) can be regressed on the input variable (the 
denominator), an interaction variable of state ownership and this input variable, plus a 
set of control variables as before – the “numerator model”. Both specifications are 
likely to provide different results, but ideally they should be consistent regarding the 
impact of state ownership. In addition to state ownership, I also include a dummy 
variable for OPEC membership and another dummy variable for state majority 
control, but the latter one did not prove significant over and above the percentage of 
state ownership. 
For the choice of control variables, the industry literature provides some guidance 
on relevant variables (e.g. firms size, operational profile, oil prices), but not usually 
on their hypothesised functional form. In some cases interaction variables could be 
relevant: given the economies of scale available in the industry it is plausible to 
hypothesise, for example, that efficiency metrics are not only impacted by company 
size and operational profile respectively, but that any particular operational focus 
might be more valuable for bigger companies. A range of possible control variables is 
therefore available. Given the lack of previous multivariate studies on the 
performance impact of ownership in oil and gas, my main criteria for model selection 
are goodness of fit and, other things being equal, parsimony. In practice, I start with a 
deliberately wide choice of plausible control variables (plus state ownership and 
OPEC) to minimise the risk of omitted variables and then gradually eliminate, 
separately for each performance metric, any non-significant variables (Baum 2006).46
                                                 
45 If, for example, the total estimator indicates a performance differential of x between state firms and 
private firms, but a change in ownership results in within-differences of 2x, then it is plausible that 
time-invariant factors unobserved in the cross-sectional model play an important role. 
46 This approach is usually known as general-to-specific modelling (Hendry 1993). The empirical 
analysis starts with a general statistical model that captures the essential characteristics of the 
underlying dataset. Then, “that general model is reduced in complexity by eliminating statistically 
insignificant variables, checking the validity of the reductions at every stage to ensure congruence of 
the finally selected model” (Campos et al. 2005, p.3). 
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5.3.1 Upstream production and reserves management 
Upstream production is a popular choice for benchmarking analysis due to its 
economic importance and the (relative) homogeneity of the output product. Closely 
related to upstream production is the question of reserves management, measured by 
the production rate of reserves47, which indicates the relative pace with which 
companies (and/or nation states) chose to produce their existing reserve bases. This 
rate is a relevant metric for a number of reasons, but not necessarily an indicator of 
productivity or even efficiency – these could only be measured for reservoirs that are 
being produced rather than being available for production. 
Table 4 shows the impact of ownership on combined oil and gas production, 
controlling for firm size, operational profile and oil price environment. Hydrocarbon 
reserves are confirmed as the fundamental driver of upstream production with a 
coefficient (elasticity) of 0.66 in the pooled OLS model. When estimating oil reserves 
and gas reserves separately, both are significant, but in line with the greater share of 
oil production the elasticity for oil reserves is about 50% higher than for gas 
reserves.48  
 
T-4: Regression results for (log of) oil and gas production 
Coeff. t-test Coeff. t-test
lgResOilGas 0.6638     22.42       *** 0.4087     6.80         ***
State%*lgRes -0.0370 -7.37 *** -0.0682 -6.53 ***
OPEC*lgRes -0.0386 -4.67 *** -0.1833 -1.28
lgAssets 0.2499     8.20         *** 0.3704     8.55         ***
Up-Int 0.1612     2.10         ** 0.5574     2.37         **
lag_lgOil -0.0983 -1.98 ** -0.0672 -1.49
N
F-test
R-sq (total)
R-sq (within)
0.90
Within estimatorTotal estimator
138.1
0.76
645 645
961.5
 
Notes:  
- Dependent variable is the logarithm of annual oil and gas production (in mmboe). ‘lgResOilGas' is the logarithm of oil and gas 
reserves (in mmboe), 'State%*lgRes' and ‘OPEC*lgRes’ are interaction variables between state ownership (%) / OPEC 
membership (DV) and reserves, 'lgAssets' is the logarithm of total assets in real terms, 'Up-Int’ is the ratio of upstream 
production to the sum of upstream production and refining capacity, ‘lag_lgOil’ is the lagged logarithm of oil price in real terms. 
Constant regression term not reported. 
- Total estimator calculated with robust standard errors (HC3) as suggested in Long and Ervin (2000). Within estimator 
calculated with cluster-robust standard errors, with individual companies as clusters.  
- F-test for within estimator is for joint significance of listed variables, excluding fixed unit effects. 
- * / ** / *** : Significant at the 10-percent / 5-percent / 1-percent level, respectively. 
 
                                                 
47 The production rate, or reserves-production conversion rate, is the reciprocal value of the R/P-ratio. 
48 All regression results not included in table format within this paper are available upon request. 
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The impact of state ownership and OPEC membership are best captured through 
their interaction with oil and gas reserves – both reduce the reserves-elasticity of 
production by approximately four percentage points, with OPEC membership being 
incremental to the fact that OPEC NOCs are 100% state-owned. All three control 
variables are significant in explaining cross-sectional differences in upstream 
production, although the negative sign of the oil price variable might be surprising.49
Table 4 is based on the combined output of oil and gas. In separate regressions to 
explain the production of oil, oil reserves are significantly positive, but the coefficient 
of gas reserves is negative at 10% significance. For the production of gas, gas reserves 
are significantly positive and oil reserves are negative (at 5% significance). State 
ownership and OPEC membership are significant for both production regressions, but 
for oil the more important parameter is OPEC membership, whereas for gas it is state 
ownership – OPEC is an oil cartel after all. 
Comparing the results of the total and within estimators, the reserves coefficient is 
noticeably higher in the first model, implying that reserve levels are more important to 
determine production differences between companies than changes within companies 
over time. The impact of ownership, on the other hand, is much more “severe” in the 
fixed effects model, i.e. changes in ownership affect the production rate at almost 
double the rate implied by cross-sectional ownership differences.50 Differences in the 
size (‘lgAssets’) and composition (‘Up-Int’) of the asset base also have a greater 
bearing on changes within companies, suggesting the presence of unobserved 
variables which cause variations in asset productivity between companies – 
differences in the underlying asset quality are the most plausible explanation. 
The lower production rate of state-owned producers might be caused by a more 
conservative policy on reserve management51, by a systematic overstatement of 
                                                 
49 One possible explanation: high oil prices are an incentive to raise production levels, but technically 
this is very difficult, and rarely any firm (other than Saudi Aramco) has short-term spare production 
capacity. Plus certain licensing agreements (e.g. PSCs) stipulate higher royalty oil payments in times of 
high prices, reducing the production entitlement of firms. 
50 The within estimator of the OPEC variable is non-significant, because OPEC status does not change 
over time. Furthermore, for most OPEC producers (e.g. Saudi Aramco, NIOC or Adnoc) there is no 
data available on their total assets, so they are excluded from the full specification regression reported 
in Table 4. Most of these OPEC companies have actually grown production well beyond the growth in 
reserves over the past two decades, so their reserve elasticity of production has been greater than one.   
51 Mommer (2002) contrasts the liberal “non-proprietorial” governance approach (where the state 
merely acts as administer of the natural goods vis-à-vis the producers, and licenses are granted as soon 
as it is deemed economically viable to explore and produce) with the proprietorial governance of the 
major exporting countries (where the state acts like a private landlord, weighting off private profits, 
fiscal revenues and longer-term production strategy).    
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reserves, or by a combination of both. The above result of a greater impact of 
ownership change than of absolute ownership differences supports the notion that 
policies on reserve management are changed when ownership changes, e.g. in the 
context of a formal privatisation. Assuming that there is no overstatement of reserves, 
the impact of ownership on upstream production is quite substantial. Taking the 
results from the total estimator, and assuming a real-terms oil price of US$50 per 
barrel and median sample values for the other variables, a fully private firm is 
predicted to produce 297 million barrels per year from a reserve base of 4.4 billion 
barrels (6.8% production rate), whereas a fully state-owned NOC should produce 218 
million barrels from the same reserve base (27% less, 5.0% production rate) and an 
OPEC NOC only 158 million barrels (47% less, 3.6% production rate).52 Dropping 
the asset variable from the specification increases the risk of omitted variable bias, but 
gives an indication of production rates for the full sample including all OPEC 
producers (997 observations): private producers  remain at 6.8% vs. fully state-owned 
NOCs at 4.1% and OPEC NOCs at 2.4% production rate. The differences implied by 
the within estimator are more dramatic still.  
If NOC reserves were systematically overstated, the true NOC production rates 
would be higher and the differences in reserve management between private and state-
owned firms less pronounced. But unless all of the differences can be explained by 
reserves overstatement, NOCs are still managing their reserves more conservatively. 
This might be based on rational reasoning and policies, some of which were briefly 
touched upon in Section 5.1. The planning horizon for nation states differs from that 
of private oil companies, which – based on painful experiences – are never fully 
assured of their long-term property rights, with obvious consequences for the two 
groups’ respective incentives. Considerations of global supply and associated prices 
have always been explicit target variables for OPEC members. High current oil prices, 
due in part to the rising cost of production, reward (with hindsight) every producer 
that restrained the production of “cheap” hydrocarbons in the past. Other than by 
rational policies, a conservative reserve management can of course also be explained 
by technical or managerial deficiencies. Lack of capital, infrastructure, trained 
personnel, project expertise, etc. are factors not unheard of in the context of NOCs 
(see Appendix A). But because conservative reserve management can be a deliberate 
                                                 
52 Due to the constant and the logarithmic form this result will differ for other assumed values.  
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choice, and because the welfare consequences associated with it might well be 
positive, Victor’s (2007) terminology of “dead oil” in the hands of NOCs is somewhat 
misleading.53 In light of the climate change discussion, another issue to be considered 
in this context is the trade-off between accelerated production and environmental 
impact. 
Irrespective of ownership, the production rate is empirically also linked to the 
level of reserves: private and public companies with larger reserve bases tend to 
produce a lower proportion of these reserves (see Figure 11).54 Possible explanations 
include a greater degree of market power, diseconomies of scale in project 
management, and again the overstatement of reserve numbers. 
 
F-11:  Linear fit of production rate on logarithm of reserve base (by ownership control) 
 
Notes:  
Left graph: privately-controlled companies (N=468); right graph: state-controlled companies (N=533).  
Both graphs include observations over the period 1987 to 2006. 
 
 
                                                 
53 What obviously should be questioned, even where deferred production is justifiable on welfare 
grounds, is whether any form of reserve management can be efficiently implemented at the corporate 
level, or whether this should rather be within a transparent licensing regime.   
54 This relationship holds true for state-controlled firms in 20 out of 20 years, and for privately 
controlled firms in 19 out of 20 years. I do not report formal regression results on the production rate, 
because endogeneity tests indicate the need for IV/GMM, but none of the available instruments are 
orthogonal to the error process. 
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5.3.2 Capital and labour efficiency 
Moving beyond the upstream to a corporate perspective, the ratios of employees 
over assets (indicating labour intensity), total output over assets (indicating capital 
efficiency) and total output over employees (indicating labour efficiency) will be 
discussed next – the third metric being the mathematic product of the first two.  
As shown in Tables 5 and 6, controlling for operational business mix, oil prices 
and reserves, state ownership increases the elasticity of employment to changes in the 
asset base, i.e. state companies tend to have a greater workforce in order to manage a 
comparable asset base. For the median sample values and a real terms oil price of 
US$50 per barrel, the two regressions predict the employee/asset ratio of a non-OPEC 
fully state-owned firm to be between 23% and 71% above that of a private company. 
OPEC producers are significantly less labour-intensive then private companies, which 
shows that not all NOCs are alike, but the OPEC coefficient is based on less than 50 
observations, with only 5 member countries contributing more than 5 observations 
each. The within estimators (not reported here) strongly confirm the significance of 
ownership for the numerator model, but fail to do so for the direct ratio specification. 
 
T-5 and T-6: Total estimator for employees (left) and employees / real assets (right) 
Coeff. t-test Coeff. t-test
lgAssets 0.3163     5.23         *** State% 6.1119     3.14         ***
State%*lgAssets 0.0217     1.96         ** State%*Up-Int -9.7587 -2.80 ***
OPEC -1.4888 -8.83 *** OPEC -3.7666 -5.12 ***
lgResOilGas 0.5620     11.23       *** lgResOilGas 0.4253     2.94         ***
Up-Int -1.2812 -4.42 *** Up-Int 7.7323     5.01         ***
Dw-Int 1.2130     2.65         *** Dw-Int 12.5285   4.66         ***
lgOil 0.0724     0.64         lgOil -1.4762 -2.57 **
N N
F-test F-test
R-sq (total) R-sq (total)
554
Employ/Assets
15.1
0.27
lgEmploy
554
129.7
0.62  
Notes:  
- Dependent variables are the logarithm of number of employees (Table 5, left) and the ratio of employees over real assets (in 
US$m) (Table 6, right). 'Dw-Int’ is the ratio of refining capacity to the sum of refining capacity and oil product sales, ‘lgOil’ is 
the logarithm of the crude oil price in real terms. Constant regression terms not reported. 
- Total estimators are calculated with robust standard errors (HC3).  
- * / ** / *** : Significant at the 10-percent / 5-percent / 1-percent level, respectively. 
 
As to the metric of total output over real assets (total output defined as the sum of 
upstream production, refining capacity and oil product sales), the univariate ratio in 
Section 5.2 showed an apparent advantage for NOCs. But when estimating total 
output and controlling for business mix, oil prices and employment levels, the impact 
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of state ownership on the relationship between assets and output is statistically 
significant in favour of the private sector (see Table 7). Although direct estimation of 
the ratio is insignificant for the full time period (Table 8), private ownership is 
favourable for the period after 1991 (at 10% significance level; at 1% significance 
level for the period after 1996). Based on the full data period and previous 
assumptions, the two regression predict the output-to-assets ratio of fully state-owned 
firms to be between 7% and 18% lower than of the private sector, whereas OPEC 
producers achieve about 70% more. As before, the within estimation strongly 
supports the findings on the impact of ownership for the numerator model, but not for 
the direct ratio model where the estimation is generally less successful as evidenced 
by the significantly smaller F-test and R-squared statistics. 
 
T-7 and T-8: Total estimator for total output (left) and output / real assets (right) 
Coeff. t-test Coeff. t-test
lgAssets 0.8915     10.88       *** State% -0.0032 -0.71
State%*lgAssets -0.0212 -4.09 ***
OPEC 0.7819     13.71       *** OPEC 0.0452     6.06         ***
lgEmp 0.2700     15.00       *** lgEmp -0.0158 -2.74 ***
Up-Int 1.1872     1.28         Up-Int -0.2717 -5.23 ***
Up-Int*lgAssets -0.1762 -1.75 * Up-Int*lgEmp 0.0258     5.18         ***
Dw-Int 3.6028     2.85         *** Dw-Int -0.0682 -0.72
Dw-Int*lgAssets -0.4486 -3.37 *** Dw-Int*lgEmp 0.0085     0.98         
lgOil -0.2183 -5.03 *** lgOil -0.0263 -8.29 ***
N N
F-test F-test
R-sq (total) R-sq (total)
lgOutput
554 554
Output/Assets
20.8
0.24
541.0
0.88  
Notes:  
- Dependent variables are the logarithm of total output (=sum of upstream production, refining capacity and oil product sales in 
mmboe) (Table 7, left) and the ratio of output over real assets (Table 8, right). Constant regression terms not reported. 
- Total estimators are calculated with robust standard errors (HC3). 
- * / ** / *** : Significant at the 10-percent / 5-percent / 1-percent level, respectively. 
 
In line with the above (but not reported separately), the ratio of total output per 
employee is also affected by ownership. Controlling for asset base, business mix and 
oil prices, NOCs generate significantly less output from a comparable employment 
base. The predicted output-to-employee ratio for a typical fully state-owned firm is 
between 17% and 32% lower than the ratio of its private sector counterpart. 
The reported results generally support the hypothesis that NOCs tend to be less 
efficient than fully private firms, with the evidence being stronger in terms of labour 
efficiency. The within estimators yield even stronger results for the numerator 
 33
models, implying that the efficiency differentials can be effectively unlocked through 
a change in ownership (or through policies that go hand in hand with ownership 
change). Three caveats apply: first, the estimate of the magnitude of differences is less 
certain than the existence of such differences, largely due to the lesser goodness of fit 
of the direct ratio regressions. Second, OPEC NOCs strongly defy the general trend, 
with significantly lower employees per asset, and significantly higher output per asset 
and per employee than the average of the private sector. As explained earlier, the 
OPEC estimates unfortunately cannot draw on a full set of asset data55, and the 
inclusion of companies such as Saudi Aramco might change (or further accentuate) 
this picture. Third, in the absence of reliable data on exogenous asset quality, there is 
room for interpretation as to whether IOCs outperform non-OPEC NOCs in spite of, 
or due to differences in asset quality. 
 
5.3.3 Revenue generation 
Under the heading of revenue generation, I am looking for systematic differences 
(1) in the ability to translate physical output (i.e. upstream production, refining and oil 
product sales) into operating revenues, and/or (2) in the amount of revenue generated 
per employee.  
Based on the total estimator, state ownership negatively impacts the input-output 
efficiency for both metrics – the higher the state ownership, the lower the revenue 
generated. Tables 9 and 10 show the results for the conversion from output to 
revenues, using numerator and direct ratio specification. As before, the first of the two 
models exhibits a much better overall fit and reports a stronger significance level for 
the impact of ownership. Assuming a real-terms oil price of US$50 per barrel, the 
typical fully state-owned firm is predicted to generate between 78% and 92% of the 
real revenue per unit of output created by a fully private firm, and between 80% and 
83% of the real revenue per employee. OPEC producers once again outperform the 
other NOCs, with revenue generation approximately at par with the private sector. 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 Asset data (or estimates) is only available for a total of 47 OPEC observations: 16 on PDV 
(Venezuela), 8 each on KPC (Kuwait) and Pertamina (Indonesia), 7 on Sonatrach (Algeria), 5 on 
Petroecuador, 2 on NIOC (Iran), and one on Qatar Petroleum. No observations are available for Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq or the UAE. 
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T-9 and T-10: Total estimator for real revenues (left) and real revenues / output (right) 
Coeff. t-test Coeff. t-test
lgTotOutput 0.4149     6.25         *** State% -1.6764 -1.72 *
State%*lgOutput -0.0347 -3.90 ***
OPEC 0.2590     2.27         ** OPEC 0.1506     0.13         
lgAssets 0.3645     2.89         *** LgEmp -2.2411 -5.31 ***
lgEmp -0.0577 -2.32 *** Up-Int -7.2413 -3.38 ***
Up-Int -0.8849 -6.42 *** Dw-Int -95.3880 -9.29 ***
Dw-Int -7.8731 -3.64 *** Dw-Int*lgAssets 7.8418     7.81         ***
Dw-Int*lgAssets 0.7474     3.22         *** lgOil 7.2129     6.57         ***
lgOil 0.2403     4.60         *** lgFuelPrice 12.3907   4.15         ***
FuelPrice 0.1779     5.27         *** lgFuel*Dw-Int -16.0828 -2.57 **
N N
F-test F-test
R-sq (total) R-sq (total) 0.62
Revenues/Output
69.0
374374
lgRevenues
451.6
0.93  
Notes:  
- Dependent variables are the logarithm of revenues in real terms (Table 9, left) and the ratio of real revenues over total output 
(Table 10, right). Constant regression terms not reported. 
- Total estimators are calculated with robust standard errors (HC3). 
- * / ** / *** : Significant at the 10-percent / 5-percent / 1-percent level, respectively. 
 
The total estimator results for revenues generated per employee are very 
comparable. State ownership is a significantly negative influence, at 1% significance 
level for the numerator model and at 5% significance level for the direct ratio model.  
For both metrics and both model specifications, however, the within estimator 
does not show significant coefficients for the level of state involvement, implying that 
– when controlling for independent variables and all time-constant factors – revenue 
generation fails to improve when state ownership is reduced. For revenue generation 
per employee, this result is at odds with the earlier finding of a strong within-effect of 
ownership on the output per employee. A technical explanation could be the smaller 
sample size (374) for the revenue generation models. Only a minority of these 
observations have effective changes in ownership, leaving the within estimation 
potentially short of data to estimate its impact. A different explanation for the 
revenues generation from output is that changes in this metric can usually only be 
implemented through changes in the asset base or through policy changes 
(particularly price regulation) – the former being a long-term process and the latter 
not always corresponding to changes in ownership. 
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5.3.4 Profitability 
To investigate profitability, the link between revenue and profit generation, I 
examine two of the most commonly used metrics, return on sales (RoS) and return on 
assets (RoA). For return on sales, the total estimators at first provide an inconclusive 
picture of the impact of ownership – the revenue elasticity of income is subject to a 
negative state influence (Table 11; point estimates yield RoS of 10.8% vs. 8.8% in 
favour of private firms), whereas the direct estimation of the profitability ratio 
provides no equivalent evidence over the full data period (Table 12; point estimates: 
12.8% vs. 12.3% in favour of private firms). But examining the evolution of 
profitability over time, the analysis confirms that there is a markedly different picture 
before and after the oil price crash in 1998. Controlling for company size, 
employment levels, business mix and oil prices, state ownership pre-1998 is 
insignificant (numerator model) or even marginally positive (direct ratio model). Post-
1998, state ownership is significantly negative (at 5%) in both regressions. The likely 
causes have been discussed in Section 5.2, but the magnitude of the swing is striking. 
Furthermore, Tables 11 and 12 also show that the within estimations of state 
ownership are very significant, even over the full sample period.56 This means that 
changing ownership into private hands has a significantly positive bearing on 
profitability, regardless of the relative standing of the firm prior to privatisation, and 
is in line with the expectation of a refocusing on commercial objectives. Where NOCs 
are at least equally profitable prior to privatisation, any further improvement is 
probably not possible without either fundamentally better assets (and thus lower costs 
per unit) or retained privileges and market power. OPEC membership was 
insignificant over and above the variable for state ownership and was therefore 
excluded from the specification. 
 
                                                 
56 In fact, even in the period pre-1998 the within estimator for return on sales is significantly negative 
for state ownership (at 5% level), even though the total estimator is significantly positive. 
 36
T-11: Regression results for real income 
Coeff. t-test Coeff. t-test
lgRevenues 0.4523     2.83         *** 0.7792     2.84         ***
State%*lgRev -0.0217 -1.84 * -0.1153 -2.97 ***
lgAssets 0.4975     2.77         *** 0.1586     0.61         
lgEmp 0.0730     1.38         -0.2859 -1.43
Up-Int 1.8079     6.69         *** -0.1718 -0.19
Dw-Int 0.2726     0.57         -1.1134 -1.79 *
lgOil 1.0657     9.13         *** 1.0823     5.92         ***
N
F-test
R-sq (total/within)
502
Total estimator
119.6
0.64
Within estimator
59.6
0.48
502
 
 
T-12: Regression results for return on sales 
Coeff. t-test Coeff. t-test
State% -0.0057 -0.50 -0.0773 -3.44 ***
lgAssets -0.0279 -3.66 *** -0.0284 -1.49
LgEmp 0.0146     2.35         ** -0.0240 -1.68 *
Up-Int 0.2075     10.16       *** 0.0168     0.16         
Dw-Int 0.0354     0.60         -0.0653 -1.10
lgOil 0.0743     7.48         *** 0.0817     4.36         ***
N
F-test
R-sq (total/within)
Total estimator Within estimator
31.6 9.1
533 533
0.30 0.16  
Notes:  
- Dependent variables are the logarithm of net income in real terms (Table 11) and the ratio of return on sales (Table 12).  
- Total estimator calculated with robust standard errors (HC3), within estimator calculated with cluster-robust standard errors.  
- F-test for within estimator is for joint significance of listed variables, excluding fixed unit effects. 
- * / ** / *** : Significant at the 10-percent / 5-percent / 1-percent level, respectively. 
 
The results for the second measure of profitability, return on assets, are essentially 
comparable, but for the full time period both regressions show a significantly negative 
influence of state ownership. Using the numerator model, State Oil is predicted at 
7.9% RoA vs. Private Oil at 9.9%. Using the direct ratio specification, the point 
prediction is for 9.3% (State) vs. 11.0% (Private). 
When evaluating the higher observed profitability of private companies, potential 
differences in non-commercial objectives and taxation need to be considered. The 
impact of different tax rates on profitability depends on the cost structure of the firm. 
Assuming total costs at 80% of revenues, a difference of two percentage points in 
return on sales (based on the total estimator in Table 11) could be explained by a 
difference in effective tax rates of 10 percentage points, whereas only a tax 
differential of 49 percentage points could explain the profitability gap indicated by the 
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within estimator.57 As to non-commercial obligations of NOCs, the differences in 
profitability can be useful to estimate their shadow price: multiplying the delta in 
return on assets with the median 2006 asset value of a Top 50-ranked oil company 
(US$51 billion) yields a range of US$1.0 to 1.4 billion (post-tax), which can be 
compared to the typical (pre-tax) expenditure of NOCs on non-commercial activities. 
 
6 Conclusion 
The past years have seen a re-emergence of a fundamental debate between State 
Oil and Private Oil, which to some extent reflects broader shifts in global economic 
balance and policy approaches. To analyse the economic consequences of different 
ownership structures, this paper has compiled the most comprehensive dataset yet, 
covering the largest public and private oil firms from 1987 to 2006, based on the 
annual ‘Top 50’ ranking published in “Petroleum Intelligence Weekly”. The data also  
provides a corporate perspective on the industry’s development over the past two 
decades. It is shown how a very stable group of companies has remained dominant 
over time, and the ongoing consolidation in the industry is confirmed: over the full 
period, fully state-owned NOCs have increased average upstream production by 
161%, and fully private firms by 57%. Hybrid forms of ownership have become 
increasingly established, and some of the biggest industry players today fall into this 
category. The number of fully state-owned NOCs in the rankings has come down over 
time, but their aggregate relative contribution has hardly declined. One important 
factor has been the rebound in state ownership of oil producing assets since the turn of 
the millennium, driven largely by increasing OPEC output but also by recent asset 
nationalisations. Other observations in terms of business mix are the greater 
importance of gas across the board, and the still very pronounced upstream-focus of 
NOCs despite a gradual build-up in downstream exposure. Slicing the data cake 
according to the home nations of the companies rather than the host nations in which 
the assets are based, the three most striking global developments over the 20-year 
period are the rise of Russia and China as home nations to powerful industry players, 
the very pronounced decline in relative importance of U.S.-based firms, and the 
                                                 
57 Assuming costs at 60% of revenues, the required tax rate differentials are 5% and 25%. 
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continued growth in importance – in both absolute and relative terms – of the Middle 
East producers. 
This paper performs econometric comparisons between NOCs and IOCs on the 
basis of upstream production, reserves management, capital and labour efficiency, 
revenue generation and profitability. An important issue in making such comparisons 
are structural differences between the firms, e.g. in non-commercial objectives and the 
operational business mix. The multivariate regression framework employed in this 
analysis allows for direct control of some of these variables and the panel structure of 
the dataset also allows to control for any unobserved, time-constant variables. 
Furthermore, the comparison of different estimators provides insights as to the 
existence, importance and direction of such unobserved factors.  
NOCs, and OPEC NOCs in particular, are found to produce a significantly lower 
annual percentage of their upstream reserves than the private sector. This can be 
caused by a more conservative reserves management, a systematic overstatement of 
reserves, or by a combination of the two. Genuinely and deliberately slow production 
rates might well be justified on national welfare grounds and do not necessarily serve 
as proof of lower productivity or efficiency at state-controlled firms. Measurements of 
capital and labour efficiency, however, indicate a statistically and economically 
significant underperformance of non-OPEC State Oil vs. Private Oil. A typical NOCs 
employs up to 71% more personnel for a comparable asset base, and generates up to 
18% less output from these assets than its private counterpart. Publicly owned firms 
are also found to generate less revenue per unit of output and per employee, and they 
tend to be less profitable than their private counterparts. For all metrics other than 
revenue generation, the within estimators indicate a strongly negative significance of 
state ownership, i.e. reducing the influence of the state can indeed unlock the 
performance gaps identified by the total estimators.  
The findings are generally supportive of the hypothesis that “ownership matters” 
in the sense that private ownership encourages better performance and greater 
efficiency than state ownership does. A number of results nevertheless require further 
study and critical examination. First, substantial differences exist within each 
ownership category, such as the OPEC/non-OPEC distinction within NOCs. OPEC 
producers are not more profitable than other state-owned firms, but are at par with the 
private sector in terms of revenue generation, and outperform all other firms in terms 
of capital and labour efficiency. There obviously has been no privatisation initiative in 
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an OPEC member state yet, so one can only speculate about the impact of ownership 
change on such companies. Second, the OPEC results highlight the fact that I have not 
been able to explicitly control for all relevant factors in the pooled OLS regressions, 
most importantly the geological quality of upstream assets, which impacts on 
production costs, flow rates, and capital and labour requirements. It is plausible to 
assume that much of the difference between OPEC producers and other NOCs can be 
explained by this unobserved variable, but there can be no certainty in the absence of 
reliable data. Being able to distinguish between exogenous asset quality and 
management-induced asset quality would be another important step. Third, most 
performance and efficiency metrics have been estimated using two different 
specifications, the “nominator” and “direct ratio” models – ideally both should have 
provided consistent results with regard to ownership effects. However, the goodness 
of fit and overall quality of the direct ratio estimation has been limited, which 
probably contributed to some differences on the individual result level. Finally, there 
might be questions about the longer-term sustainability of the private sector 
advantage. A large part of the current profitability gap materialised after the oil price 
crash in 1998, when private firms under-invested in new production capacity. It has 
also been suggested that in a high energy price environment the resource-holding 
nations will be at greater liberty to chose like-minded partners, and that therefore 
Western IOCs might struggle to access new reserves as NOC-NOC cooperation 
becomes the norm.  
These future concerns notwithstanding, the balance of evidence presented in this 
paper suggests that a (political) preference for State Oil usually comes at a tangible 
economic cost. 
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Appendix A: National Oil Companies 
 
Sectors such as postal services, railways, telecommunications, electricity, gas, 
water, but also airlines, oil, coal and steel are among those industries that historically 
were prone to be state-owned. Whereas many of those industries are (or used to be) 
natural monopolies and/or are subject to market failures, the natural resource 
industries are typically in state ownership for political reasons, including high 
possible rents, economic importance and employment generation. With regard to the 
energy sector, most people including the government found it “too important to be left 
to the market” (Robinson 1993, p.57). 
 
The emergence of NOCs 
The importance of the petroleum industry was widely recognised from the early 
20th century. Governments since had a wide range of reasons to justify their invention 
in one of the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy. The first NOC is believed to 
have been created in Austria in 1908 when the private oil producers faced a situation 
of excess supply of crude. Emperor Franz Joseph at the time approved the building of 
a topping plant owned and operated by the government, which helped process the 
crude and further developed end markets for oil products (Heller 1980). European 
states, particularly the colonial powers, set up or participated in oil companies in order 
to control the domestic petroleum markets and pursue upstream exploration and 
production abroad, usually within their respective colonial domains. The creation of 
Agip in Italy in 1926 was the first instance of a consuming country aiming to counter-
balance the influence of outside IOCs in the domestic downstream market. As to 
developing countries, Latin America was leading the way, with Argentina’s YPF 
being first NOC to be founded in 1922 (Linde 2000).  
A major increase in numbers of NOCs occurred in the exporting countries during the 
1960s and 1970s (Bentham and Smith 1987), triggered by the worldwide tide of 
nationalism, the desire for state control over key resources, the apparently ever 
increasing rents in the oil sector and the successes of OPEC. Finally, the last 
significant NOCs to be set up outside the communist influence sphere were in 
producing but net-importing countries (e.g. Canada, UK), sparked by security of 
supply concerns after the OPEC revolution. By the end of the 1970s, among the net 
importing countries, the U.S. was the only significant producer without an NOC 
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(Linde 2000). Overall, the foundation of state-controlled companies had a significant 
impact on the ownership structure of the oil and gas industry. Heller (1980) reports 
that from 1963 to 1975, outside the U.S., Canada and the centrally planned 
economies, public sector control rose from 9% to 62% in production, from 14% to 
24% in refining, and from 11% to 21% in marketing and that this trend was 
continuing into the 1980s. 
 
The rationale for NOCs 
The initial role of most NOCs could be described as custodians of the domestic oil 
and gas sector, either by taking over operations from the IOCs or by working 
alongside them (Stevens 2004). For a large number of countries in the world, the oil 
and gas sector is a key industry to determine economic, social and political outcomes, 
and this is particularly true in the developing world. In exporting countries, the sector 
accounts for high percentages of GDP, government revenues and foreign exchange 
earnings. In importing countries, it typically accounts for a large share of foreign 
exchange expenditures. Furthermore, taxes on oil consumption contribute importantly 
to fiscal revenues – or, in some cases, the subsidies on oil consumption cause large 
fiscal deficits (McPherson 2003).  
Stevens (2004) summarises the main arguments why governments chose to set up 
a National Oil Company with significant influence over the sector, rather than opting 
for more liberal governance regimes. The ‘OPEC revolution’ and oil nationalisation 
of the 1970s was carried by a notion that IOCs were backed by foreign, imperialistic 
governments and opposed to national interests (Grayson 1981; Hartshorn 1993). 
Many countries with an important oil and gas industry thus demanded state control, 
but did not deem regulation or legislation to be appropriate alternatives. The spirit of 
nationalism plus the inherent weakness of the private sector in most developing 
countries largely ruled out the option of domestic, but privately-owned operators in 
the sector (Linde 2000). But even in developed countries, the wider political view 
after WWII suggested that the state could and should actively tackle social and 
economic issues. State ownership in the upstream ensures that all excess rents accrue 
to the public, and in the downstream a key attraction is control over the pricing of oil 
products, an area of great political and social sensitivity (McPherson 2003). The 
perceived cash-richness of NOCs allowed for the introduction of company objectives 
other than profit, e.g. employment generation, development of local commercial and 
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technical capacity, provision of social and other infrastructure, income redistribution 
through subsidised prices, and assistance in state borrowing (Nore 1980; Grayson 
1981; Horn 1995). In many ways was the corporate purpose of the NOCs “tied to the 
national purpose” (Khan 1987, p.188). In oil importing countries, the creation of 
NOCs was a tool to address worries about the security of supply and to balance the 
power of the exporting nations, but also of powerful IOCs and their respective home 
countries. NOCs also provide governments a “window to the oil industry” (Grayson 
1981, p.10), which helps to overcome information asymmetries between the sovereign 
and private industry participants – such asymmetries could otherwise impair the 
state’s ability to conduct effective oversight and implement appropriate regulation. 
It is very conceivable that policy makers are aware of the potential economic 
issues associated with NOCs (see below), but that these shortcomings are judged to be 
outweighed by broader social and political benefits, if the interests of the private 
sector participants and the public welfare are not fully aligned.   
 
Key issues of NOCs 
Despite the apparent rationale in favour of NOCs, their performance and 
commercial efficiency is often believed to be lacking. Although much anecdotal 
“evidence” exists, it is rare for precise numbers to make their way into the public 
sphere. One exception was in 1998, when the IMF commissioned an independent 
audit of three state-owned companies in Indonesia, among them the NOC Pertamina. 
The audit report, which was leaked to the press, calculated losses of US$6.1 billion 
due to corruption and inefficiencies over two years time, which for each year was in 
excess of 10% of the national budget (Linde 2000). The auditors found excessive 
mark-ups on contracts, sales of natural gas below market price, questionable fees to 
trading companies partially owned by the President’s family, etc. In terms of 
operational efficiency, the upstream production cost per barrel was calculated at 
US$5.50 for Pertamina compared to an industry average of US$1.20 at the time. 
Another audit of Nigerian state oil company NNPC in 1999 for the World Bank 
estimated annual losses of between US$800 million and US$1 billion (McPherson 
2003). Many authors blame the operational inefficiencies at NOCs on a lack of 
technical and managerial capabilities (Jaidah 1980; Al-Mazeedi 1992; Gochenour 
1992). They argue that IOCs used the shelter of high energy prices between the early 
1970s and 1985 to restructure and improve efficiency levels through R&D, whereas 
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the NOCs failed to invest in upgrading facilities or new technologies. In terms of 
human resources, NOCs are accused to be overstaffed and pay above-average wages 
(Waelde 1995), but also to tend to recruit according to family, tribal or religious 
considerations rather than according to qualification and performance (Al-Mazeedi 
1992). As additional issues, McPherson (2003) points out the frequent lack of 
competition for NOCs, a lack of corporate governance mechanisms58, the distorting 
nature of fuel subsidies59, and conflicts of interest embedded within the domestic 
industry structure - in many countries the NOC devises, implements and supervises 
sector policy60 whilst also being the most important industry actor. 
 
NOCs and their governments 
NOCs, although originally set up as mere instruments of the state, have become 
over time – probably inevitably – “major actors on their own, interposed between the 
government per se and, mostly foreign, oil companies“ (Waelde 1995). NOCs and 
their governments are thus separate actors, who can share a common agenda and 
objectives, but in reality often have quite divergent views. The principal trade-off 
which has been evidenced in many different countries is between the level of 
government control imposed on the NOC and the ability of the NOC to efficiently 
pursue its business interests. In the view of some, this trade-off has become a no-win 
dichotomy: “Either the NOC exerted its will and pursued its own goals which were 
likely to lead to takeover of the state, or the state exerted its will and effectively 
inhibited the NOC from operating effectively” (Stevens 2004, p.14). 
 
Liberalisation, privatisation, and resurgence of the state  
Certainly not all NOCs are overburdened with non-commercial objectives or 
sheltered from effective competition, and in other countries governments have taken 
steps to address such issues. Liberalisation (or deregulation), understood as the 
opening up to competitive forces, and privatisation, the transfer of ownership from 
                                                 
58 Neither the NOC managers nor the politicians in government have strong incentives to enforce 
governance standards. Managers strive to maximise their scope of discretionary decision-making, 
whilst the government often has an interest to obscure the exact uses of cash for political purposes. 
59 In 1999, 13 out of the 15 major oil exporting countries in the world were subsidising domestic 
petroleum prices. The subsidies in these countries on average accounted for 3.8% of GDP and 18.8% of 
all government expenditure (IMF 2002). In 2005, Indonesia alone is estimated to have spent US$13.8 
billion on fuel subsidies (Bloomberg 2005). 
60 Even in countries where a ministry is formally in charge, the NOC often contributes substantially to 
the decision-making process due to its superior resources and industrial expertise. 
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public to private hands, are two logically distinct concepts, as “[p]ublic ownership 
does not imply state monopoly and private ownership does not entail competition” 
(Vickers and Yarrow 1988, p.45). Both are nevertheless frequently intertwined in 
practice. The historical context of many NOCs – the desire for complete state control 
– does not sit well with the idea of competition. Furthermore, there are powerful 
interest groups within a public enterprise – including management, employees and 
unions – that have an incentive to oppose the introduction of competitive forces. On 
the other hand, groups with an explicit interest in such competitive pressure – e.g. 
potential market entrants and the wider consuming public – often are not as effective 
in arguing their case. Commercialisation, a company-internal process of increasing 
the focus on efficiency and profitability, can be targeted and achieved independently 
of liberalisation and privatisation, but there are also important practical 
interconnections. First, market liberalisation is most often employed as a policy tool 
when either there is an abuse of market power or a lack of efficiency due to a lack of 
competition. In the latter case the goal of liberalisation then is a greater degree of 
commercialisation within the industry (Vickers and Yarrow 1988). And secondly, the 
announcement of privatisation often acts as a catalyst for commercialisation of the 
company to be privatised. In many cases a higher degree of commercialisation is 
actually a pre-requisite to make the privatisation palatable for private investors. A 
greater focus on commercialisation implies restrictions on non-commercial objectives 
and activities of the firm, but attempts to impose such restrictions without  changing 
ownership have often been difficult (Horn 1995). Kikeri, Nellis and Shirley (1992) 
note that since the 1970s nearly all developing countries have tried to reform state-
owned enterprises61 without changing ownership. Although there has been some 
improvement, the overall implementation has been difficult, the entire reform was 
seldom enacted and “most importantly, performance improvements have proved 
difficult to sustain once the crisis that instigated the reform dissipated” (Kikeri et al. 
1992, p.4). 
Wolf and Pollitt (2008) show that partial privatisation can act as a catalyst for 
important performance improvements in NOCs. Examples exist where governments 
have undertaken partial privatisations whilst enacting supplementary measures to 
                                                 
61 These reforms include: increasing competition, reducing privileges, instituting hard budget 
constraint, reducing political intervention in management, reducing importance of non-commercial 
objectives, increasing accountability of management for financial performance, etc. 
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strengthen competition for the NOCs and perpetuate these efficiency gains. In 
Norway, the state traditionally held part of its interests through the two oil companies 
Statoil and Norsk Hydro, but a significant part was also held directly (the so-called 
‘State Direct Financial Interest’ – SDFI), but managed by Statoil on behalf of the 
state. When Statoil was partly privatised in 2001, the state sold some of its SDFI 
assets to the company in order to make it more competitive on a global level. 
However, to safeguard effective competition in the Norwegian oil and gas sector, the 
government also auctioned another part of the SDFI to parties other than Statoil in 
early 2003.62 China, on the other hand, has opted to introduce a degree of competition 
between its different, part-privatised NOCs.63 PetroChina, Sinopec and CNOOC (and 
their unlisted parent companies) compete with each other in large parts of the oil, gas 
and petrochemicals businesses, although the companies in principle have a different 
focus of operations.64
The first privatisations of NOCs within the oil and gas sector occurred in the UK 
(BP in 1977, followed by two other NOCs in the early 1980s), and then – up until the 
mid 1990s – in net consuming countries such as France, Austria, Spain or Italy, as the 
security of supply became an international concern at the level of OECD and IEA 
rather than the nation state (Linde 2000). Net oil-exporting states took longer to be 
convinced of the possible benefits of liberalisation and privatisation. After all, oil 
producing assets in the Middle East had only been nationalised in the 1970s and other 
producing regions in Latin America and Africa were no strangers to foreign 
domination and imperialism either (Waelde 1995). As far as OPEC member states 
were concerned, they emphasised OPEC policies over national policies (Linde 2000). 
Non-OPEC producing countries took the lead in the late 1980s, although many of 
them were led down this path by external pressures of international creditors such as 
the World Bank and the IMF, who were keen to implement “Washington Consensus”-
inspired stabilisation programmes. Argentina was first to sell 60% of its NOC 
Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) on the stock market for US$4.2 billion 
(Grosse and Yanes 1998). The transformation of YPF into a commercial entity was 
generally considered a great success and other Latin American countries followed to 
                                                 
62 In 2007, the Norwegian state allowed a merger between Statoil and the oil business of Norsk Hydro, 
which reduced competition in the domestic oil and gas sector, but this was judged necessary to have the 
combined company compete on a global level with much larger private and state-owned competitors.  
63 The competition could also be between different subsidiaries of one NOC (McPherson 2003). 
64 CNOOC retains the monopoly on offshore E&P, PetroChina’s activities are biased towards onshore 
E&P, while Sinopec is strongest in R&M. 
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liberalise (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador) or even privatise (Brazil) their respective oil 
sectors and NOCs.  
A major boost for the privatisation agenda was the collapse of the centrally 
planned economies, although the framework for voucher privatisation in these 
transition economies is unique relative to other market economies (Boycko et al. 
1994). Since 2000 countries such as China, India, Pakistan, Norway and Japan have 
chosen to (part-)privatise their NOCs, but there is also a powerful counter-movement 
towards greater state participation once again. Some of the key producing and reserve 
holding countries still do not allow foreign participation in the upstream at all (e.g. 
Saudi Arabia, Mexico) or on very restrictive policies only (e.g. Kuwait, Iran, UAE) 
and sustained levels of high energy prices are likely to relieve budgetary pressures for 
any kind of reform. Russia, Venezuela and Bolivia have seen the re-nationalisation of 
strategic assets or companies, and more countries might follow suit – or at the very 
least increase the government take through taxation, as even “liberal” countries/states 
such as the UK and Alaska recently did.  
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